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Abstract 
 
Many high-income countries have cut public health-care spending since the 
global economic downturn in 2008. In some cases these cuts have been accompanied by 
calls to expand private financing to improve the efficiency of health systems. In low- and 
middle-income countries seeking to increase access to health care, it is sometimes 
suggested that private financing is more effective than public financing because of weak 
state institutions and bureaucratic shortcomings. 
In this paper, we review the theoretical and empirical evidence on private 
financing in terms of cost, efficiency, equity, and financial protection. We consider 
private health insurance, medical savings accounts, and user charges in high-, middle-, 
and low-income countries. 
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The theoretical and empirical evidence reveals major market failures in the 
health sector. It is unlikely that private financing generates better results than public 
financing. Still, as private financing options are heterogeneous, it is possible that a 
particular form might play a beneficial role in a specific setting. Given the current state 
of knowledge, however, any calls to increase private financing must be accompanied by 
robust evidence, such as real-world pilot studies. 
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Background 
 
Many high-income countries have cut public health-care spending since the 
global economic downturn in 2008 (Cylus et al., 2012; Reeves et al., 2014). In some 
cases these cuts have been accompanied by calls to expand private financing to improve 
the efficiency of health systems (Reynolds and McKee, 2012). In low- and middle-
income countries seeking to increase access to health care, it is sometimes suggested 
that private financing is more effective than public financing because of weak state 
institutions and bureaucratic shortcomings (Pauly et al., 2006). These trends have 
fuelled debates about how to fund health systems sustainably. Although these debates 
are sometimes ideological, reflecting different views about the relationship between the 
individual and the state, they need to be evidence-based. 
In this paper, we review the theoretical and empirical evidence on private 
financing in terms of cost, efficiency, equity, and financial protection. We consider 
private health insurance, medical savings accounts, and user charges in high-, middle-, 
and low-income countries. There are similar debates about the role of the state in other 
parts of health systems, such as service delivery by physicians and institutions, 
procurement of health system inputs, and professional education (Hsiao, 1995), but 
these are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Private health insurance: theoretical evidence 
 
The theoretical deficiencies of unregulated private health insurance (PHI) 
markets are well-documented (Arrow, 1963; Hsiao, 1995; Barr, 2004). Most 
commentators agree that PHI systems must be regulated to some extent, although the 
scale and nature of such regulation are rarely specified. One important concern is 
information asymmetry between patients and insurers. Individuals know more than 
insurance companies about their health and the aspects of their lifestyles that increase 
the risk of disease or injury. Consequently, patients may buy insurance plans that are 
underpriced (i.e. adverse selection). Individuals may also engage in riskier behaviour or 
seek more treatment than they would if they were uninsured (i.e. moral hazard) (Pauly, 
1974).2 Both adverse selection and moral hazard prevent insurers from accurately 
estimating whether enrolees are at high or low risk of needing health care – a necessity 
for setting actuarially-fair premiums. 
This leaves insurance companies with two main options. They can charge 
average premiums to groups consisting of both low- and high-risk individuals to pool 
risks. Low-risk patients will face disproportionately high premiums and may leave the 
schemes; the remaining high-risk patients will then face increasing prices and may 
eventually forgo insurance. This is known as a premium spiral. Alternatively, insurers 
can try to separate low- and high-risk individuals into different plans. Insurers can then 
offer lower premiums to healthier individuals to retain these clients. For example, 
insurers can raise the premiums of patients with chronic illnesses. Insurers may even 
choose not to cover these patients or the care related to their known conditions. The 
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lack of cross-subsidisation from the rich and healthy (usually low-risk) to the poor and 
sick (usually high-risk) is highly regressive (Barr, 2004). 
Insurers can further limit their exposure to risk by reducing benefit packages or 
imposing spending caps. Both expose patients to potentially severe financial risks. This 
not only threatens the solvency of individuals and households, but also has adverse 
macroeconomic effects. For example, it could increase demand for poverty alleviation 
programmes and distort the balance between saving and consumption (Cheung and 
Padieu, 2013). 
For an insurance market to operate efficiently, patients must be able to switch 
insurers easily. This should incentivise companies to compete based on premiums, 
benefits packages, and other plan features (Thomson et al., 2013a). However, there are 
entry barriers for insurance firms, notably substantial equity capital and technical 
expertise. There have been documented cases of insurers forming cartels and exploiting 
their market dominance, which reduces the competitiveness of the insurance market 
(Hsiao, 1995). 
Transaction costs are also an issue. Private insurers must continuously monitor 
and assess the risk of their enrolees. Insurers spend money on marketing their 
products. These costs are not incurred by statutory universal systems. 
In short, market failures in the health sector may undermine PHI. Theory 
predicts that insurers will seek to maximise their client base and minimise 
unquantifiable risk. They should compete for individuals at all levels of risk, given the 
ability to match premiums to risk. However, high-risk individuals usually have complex 
disorders and comorbidities, and their risk is often least predictable. Insurers may seek 
to exclude patients with pre-existing health conditions from coverage. If these patients 
are to obtain coverage, the state or some well-funded entity must be the insurer of last 
resort. This is, in effect, the role in the USA of Medicare – a publicly-funded insurance 
programme for people age 65 and older – and Medicaid – a publicly-funded insurance 
programme for low-income individuals and families. The financial burden of these two 
high-risk and high-cost groups is incurred by the public sector. 
 
PHI: empirical evidence from high-income countries 
 
The validity of these theoretical issues is supported by empirical evidence from 
the USA, where PHI is the main source of health-care funding for those of working age. 
Prior to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act1 about one out of six Americans 
were uninsured (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2012), and one study estimated that 62.1% of 
personal bankruptcies in 2007 were due to medical costs (Himmelstein et al., 2009). 
Meanwhile, the USA spends the most per capita on health care in the world, accounting 
for 17.9% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012 (World Bank, 2014). It is widely-
acknowledged that market failures contribute, at least in part, to high private health 
expenditure and numbers of uninsured patients in the USA (Maynard and Dixon, 2002). 
It is unclear whether private insurers outperform public insurers in containing costs, 
with some evidence suggesting that Medicare is better able to control costs than private 
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insurers (Boccuti and Moon, 2003). The authors attributed this finding to the ability of 
Medicare – a single purchaser for a large number of patients – to drive prices down 
aggressively for the products and services it covers.  
The high health spending in the USA fails to achieve commensurate outcomes. 
The country ranks low among member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) on various health-care quality indicators, including 
deaths due to medical errors, avoidable mortality rates, and maternal death rates (Nolte 
and McKee, 2003; Nolte and McKee, 2008; Jost 2007). A recent international survey by 
the Commonwealth Fund found that 75% of American adults believe that their health 
system requires fundamental changes or should be rebuilt. This was a higher 
proportion than in any of the ten high-income comparison countries (Schoen et al., 
2013). 
 
Figure 1. Size of private health insurance markets (% of total health expenditure) in 
selected OECD countries (2012) 
 
Notes: 2012 data were unavailable for Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Spain; 2011 
data were used for these countries. 
Source: OECD Health Statistics (2014) 
 
In the European Economic Area, PHI plays a secondary role to statutory health 
insurance (Figure 1). In these countries, PHI is substitutive, complementary, or 
supplementary (Figure 2) (Thomson and Mossialos, 2004). In a substitutive scheme, 
coverage is limited to individuals who are excluded from or opt out of statutory health 
insurance. In Germany, for example, about 11% of individuals – mostly high earners – 
opt out of social insurance in favor of private insurance. In a complementary scheme, it 
is used to pay for services that are not covered by statutory health insurance, such as 
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dental care or co-pays for medicines. In France, over 96% of the population has 
complementary insurance to cover user charges. In a supplementary scheme, PHI 
enhances consumer choice of health products and services. For example, patients may 
have access to quicker care, more health-care providers, or better hospital amenities 
(e.g. a single room). 
Unlike the rest of Europe, the Netherlands and Switzerland have privately-
administered health insurance schemes, coupled with public oversight. Both systems 
have measures to correct the shortcomings of PHI and operate like social health 
insurance. For example, the Swiss and Dutch authorities require universal coverage to 
limit adverse selection (i.e. there is a mandate that every person must buy a basic plan), 
with subsidies for low-income individuals; supplementary insurance is available. 
Insurers are legally-bound to charge a single rate for defined populations (e.g. all 
residents of a Swiss canton), also known as community rating. Both countries force 
insurers to cover patients with pre-existing health conditions, as well as high-risk 
patients like the elderly and the unemployed. Government authorities in each country 
also apply risk-equalisation formulas to alleviate the financial burden on insurers that 
cover more high-risk individuals (Reinhardt, 2004; Leu et al., 2009; Cheng, 2010). 
The regulation needed for PHI markets to operate efficiently is likely to add 
considerably to administrative costs (Woolhandler et al., 2003). According to the most 
recent data from the OECD, the Netherlands and Switzerland have two of the four most 
expensive health systems in the European Economic Area – measured in terms of total 
health expenditure as a percentage of GDP. It is also difficult to correct all of the 
shortcomings of PHI through regulation (Thomson et al., 2013a; van de Ven et al., 2013). 
Hsiao (1995) reviewed the empirical evidence from high-income countries on whether 
measures intended to correct the failures of PHI achieve their objectives. He concluded 
that while some measures are usually effective (e.g. compulsory universal coverage), 
others are only moderately effective or ineffective (e.g. community rating). 
The data from Europe indicate that PHI generally leads to inequitable access to 
health care, does not contain costs or increase efficiency, and undermines the financial 
stability of statutory health insurance (Mossialos and Thomson, 2002; Thomson and 
Mossialos, 2004). Other countries that rely on PHI to varying extents, such as Australia 
and Chile, have encountered similar issues (Hall et al., 1999; Sapelli, 2004; Armstrong et 
al., 2010). However, the impact of PHI varies depending on the type of PHI, the 
regulatory environment, and the relationship between the private and statutory 
systems (Colombo and Tapay, 2004). 
As PHI systems are heterogeneous, it is necessary to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of individual systems. As described above, PHI schemes in some countries 
are heavily regulated and closely resemble social health insurance. In others where the 
insurance markets are less regulated, the adverse effects of PHI on costs, efficiency, 
equity, and financial protection seem to outweigh the benefits. 
 
Figure 2. The % of the population with PHI coverage (by insurance type) in selected 
OECD countries (2011) 
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Notes: Primary PHI includes substitutive schemes. The plans in Denmark, Israel, Korea, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, and Switzerland may include both complementary and supplementary benefits. 2011 data 
were unavailable for France and Switzerland; 2010 data were used for France and 2007 data for 
Switzerland. 
Source: Adapted from OECD Health at a Glance (2013) 
 
PHI: empirical evidence from low- and middle-income countries 
 
Some commentators have proposed PHI as a stepping stone on the path to 
universal health care in developing economies (Pauly et al., 2006; Pauly et al., 2009). 
PHI currently plays a modest role in low- and middle-income countries, generally 
covering <10% of individuals. The main exceptions are Brazil, Namibia, South Africa, 
and Zimbabwe, where private insurers account for >20% of total health expenditure 
(Sekhri and Savedoff, 2005). Proponents of PHI argue that it is the best starting point for 
risk pooling in developing countries, given large informal economies, inefficient taxation 
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mechanisms, high out-of-pocket spending (Figure 3), and corruption. Publicly-financed 
systems, they argue, are potential long-term options. Advocates also note that PHI 
systems preceded publicly-financed systems in many Western European countries, 
cited as evidence that PHI may be a prerequisite for tax-financed or social health 
insurance (Sekhri and Savedoff, 2005). 
 
Figure 3. Public-private mix of funding (% of total health expenditure) by region and by 
income group (2012) 
 
Source:  World Bank (2014) 
 
One of the most common applications of PHI in low- and middle-income 
countries is community-based health insurance – small, autonomous PHI schemes run 
by individual communities that can potentially be scaled up (Carrin et al., 2005). It has 
grown in popularity over the past two decades, and the success reported from Rwanda 
with this type of insurance has led to calls for its more widespread use. A systematic 
review of the literature found mixed evidence on the costs and benefits of these 
schemes. While they may improve financial protection and reduce out-of-pocket 
spending, there is little evidence that they improve health-care quality or efficiency 
(Ekman, 2004). The review concluded that "these types of community financing 
arrangements are, at best, complementary to other more effective systems of health 
financing." 
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The experiences to date with community-based health-insurance schemes, 
including those in Kenya and Uganda, suggest that they are often inefficient and 
unsustainable. Many of the schemes are small-scale and lack adequate funding, risk 
pooling, and governance (Carrin et al., 2005; Basaza et al., 2009). In addition, it is worth 
noting that the Rwandan system is heavily regulated by the government and bears 
strong resemblance to social health insurance: there is high uptake of the community 
schemes due to various incentives, the central government and donors provide 
stewardship and financial and institutional backing, and the central government 
redistributes some of the pooled funds between communities (Logie et al., 2008; 
Ministry of Health of the Republic of Rwanda, 2010; Lu et al., 2012). Rwanda has 
deviated substantially from the traditional model of community-based health insurance, 
as applied in other settings. 
The potential benefits of PHI in developing countries must be carefully weighed 
against the possible drawbacks. The introduction of PHI may lead to a two-tiered 
system that exacerbates social inequality, which may be difficult to correct later on 
(Hsiao, 1995). This is especially problematic in countries that are divided on ethnic, 
linguistic, religious, or economic grounds, where one group can disproportionately 
access private insurance. The empirical evidence indicates that such countries are less 
willing to invest in public goods that will benefit the general population (Powell-Jackson 
et al., 2011). The emergence of a private system may also entrench the power of 
insurers to block changes to the system that are not in their best interests (Hsiao, 1995).  
Overall, the evidence is inconclusive on whether it is better in the short- and 
long-run to introduce public- or private-sector models in developing countries to 
promote equitable, efficient, and sustainable health systems. However, one study has 
found that higher government revenue from progressive taxes (e.g. capital gains, profits, 
and income) is associated with greater progress towards universal health coverage, 
based on data from 89 low- and middle-income countries (Reeves et al., forthcoming). If 
developing countries are to introduce public-sector models, it will require strong 
political leadership, technical assistance, capacity development, and foreign aid (Hsiao, 
1995; Hsiao, 2014). There are a number of country experiences that offer valuable 
lessons, including the health extension programme in Ethiopia, the 30-baht financing 
scheme in Thailand, and the construction of health facilities in India (Tamil Nadu) and 
Bangladesh (Balabanova et al., 2013). Countries that have expanded coverage at a low 
cost have been characterised by political commitment, strong leaders who have taken 
advantage of windows of opportunity, and stable and effective institutions. These 
success stories have been marked by sustained investment in training, infrastructure, 
and management. 
 
The way forward: consumer-directed health care and cost sharing? 
 
Other options have attracted attention as alternatives to PHI. In recent years, the 
USA – one of the countries that experiments most actively with market-based 
approaches – has seen the rise of so-called consumer-directed health care (Antos et al., 
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2012). The premise is simple: instil responsibility in patients for their own health 
spending and incentivise them to use health care efficiently. 
Consumer-directed health care has primarily taken the form of medical savings 
accounts – also called health savings accounts – which are earmarked funds that 
patients can withdraw from to pay for health care. Each individual or family contributes 
to their own account and also receive funds from the government. There is no risk 
pooling between individuals. The accounts are usually coupled with high-deductible 
insurance to protect against health-care bills that would lead to financial ruin. Medical 
savings accounts are only used in China, Singapore, South Africa, and the USA. Most of 
the evidence suggests that medical savings accounts are inequitable, do not provide 
adequate financial protection, fail to contain costs, and do not promote efficiency 
(Wouters et al., forthcoming). 
In Singapore, where medical savings accounts have been longest established and 
most closely studied, they cover a small share of total health expenditure. Patients in 
Singapore spend more out-of-pocket – as a percentage of total health expenditure – than 
patients in any other high-income country. The medical savings accounts in Singapore 
are also backed up by several schemes, including high-deductible insurance against 
catastrophic costs and a safety net for indigent patients (McKee and Busse, 2013). 
Many countries also rely on cost sharing – deductibles, co-insurance, co-pays, or 
any combination of these – to try to limit moral hazard and generate revenue for the 
health system (Thomson et al., 2010). Advocates of user charges argue that when 
insurers cover all or most of the costs of health care, patients are less cost-conscious 
and more likely to over-utilise health care. They contend that cost sharing sends 
consumers more accurate price signals and improves the efficiency of health systems. 
Opponents claim that cost sharing is highly regressive, as it only targets those who use 
health care – mostly low-income individuals. Critics also stress that it can dissuade 
patients from seeking necessary treatment (Bloche, 2007). 
There is considerable evidence, including data from the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment, a large-scale randomised controlled trial, that cost sharing leads to 
indiscriminate cuts in utilisation: it reduces the use of both unnecessary and necessary 
health care (Newhouse, 1993; Buntin et al., 2006; Goldman et al., 2004; Goldman et al., 
2007; Austvoll-Dahlgren et al., 2008; Trivedi et al., 2008; Buntin et al., 2011; Fung et al., 
2014). Individuals should be exempt from cost sharing based on age, income, disease 
type, and other appropriate criteria (Austvoll-Dahlgren et al., 2008). In many countries, 
for example, treatments for life-threatening and chronic illnesses are not subject to cost 
sharing. 
A recent innovation has been "value-based" cost sharing – cost sharing that is 
structured in a way that is intended to only discourage the use of low-value care 
(Chernew et al., 2007). For instance, an insurer may exempt preventive services (e.g. 
immunisations) from cost sharing, charge higher co-pays for patients who buy branded 
medicines when cheaper generics are available, or reward patients who participate in 
health-promoting activities (e.g. smoking cessation programmes) (Thomson et al., 
2013b). There are practical and ethical problems with differentiating high- and low-
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value care, such as whose values to consider. It is not yet clear in what instances value-
based cost sharing is a viable option, and the results to date have been mixed (Chernew 
et al., 2008; Thomson et al., 2013b; Maciejewski et al., 2014). 
Many developing countries face unique challenges when considering cost 
sharing: extreme poverty, chronically-underfunded health systems, and weak taxation 
mechanisms. A systematic review of the effect of cost sharing on health service use in 
low- and middle-income countries found little high-quality evidence (Lagarde and 
Palmer, 2011). Studies have generally found that introducing or increasing user fees 
leads to lower use of curative and preventive services; removing or decreasing user fees 
leads to greater use. The long-term effects of these policy changes are unclear, however, 
and there are few studies of the impact of user fees on medication use and quality of 
care. More research is needed to outline the optimal role for cost sharing in resource-
poor countries. 
In theory, consumer-directed health care and cost sharing could succeed under 
certain conditions. First, patients must have access to information about the price and 
quality of health care to make informed decisions. It is often difficult or impossible for 
patients to obtain these data (Reinhardt, 2006). Second, patients must be able to 
distinguish between low- and high-value health care. In reality, few patients are 
qualified to judge their care needs, which may result in worse health outcomes and 
higher costs in the long-run (Bloche, 2007). Third, complementary supply-side policies 
are needed to contain costs. For example, consumer-directed health care does not 
prevent clinicians from ordering excessive tests, which is especially likely if they receive 
a fee for each service (Emanuel et al., 2012). Fourth, a national culture of individualism, 
personal responsibility, and saving must exist (Nichols et al., 1997). Finally, a high 
income per capita is required to sustain medical savings accounts. 
As all of these conditions are unlikely to be met in most settings, other financing 
options should be considered. Alternatively, it can be argued that greater efforts should 
be made to fulfil these conditions. For example, institutions could systematically collect 
and disseminate easy-to-understand data to patients about the price and quality of 
health care. However, it would be important to determine the administrative costs this 
would entail, whether it is even feasible given the complexities of health-care decision-
making, and whether all shortcomings of consumer-directed health care can be 
adequately addressed. 
 
Conclusions and policy implications 
 
Many nations are reassessing, reforming, and restructuring their models of 
health system financing. In high-income countries, the recent economic downturn has 
been used to justify austerity measures and the re-examination of market-based 
financing options. Proponents of private models suggest that the financial interaction of 
patients, insurers, and physicians should stimulate quality improvements, price 
reductions, and greater access to health care. In low- and middle-income countries, 
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there is uncertainty about whether private- or public-financing models, or a mix of the 
two, are the best means to reach universal health coverage. 
The adverse effects of austerity on health and the limitations of private financing 
models are well-documented (Stuckler and Basu, 2013). Given the market failures in the 
health sector, it is unlikely that private financing generates better results than public 
financing. Governments may also use health systems to pursue equity objectives, such 
as income redistribution, that compete with economic efficiency goals. This is more 
easily achieved through publicly-financed systems. Still, notions of solidarity vary 
across countries, which may influence the uptake of different financing models. 
During economic recessions, it is important for policymakers to withstand 
myopic pressures to adopt inefficient policies. One of the challenges in the policymaking 
arena is that changes in government can lead to pursuits of diametrically-opposed 
solutions, whereas more gradual and stepwise changes are generally advisable. 
Governments seeking to expand private financing should test their proposals in real-
world pilot studies. 
 
Notes 
 
1 These statistics have changed since the implementation of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, which was signed into law in the USA on March 23, 2010. Most 
of the provisions in the law came into force on January 1, 2014. 
 
2 Moral hazard is also a potential issue in publicly-funded health systems. 
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